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A perennial objection against historical materi-
alism is that that which is determined seems capable of 
becoming independent and developing a life of its own. 
Further, through its independence, it seems capable of 
conditioning and affecting the determining elements. 
Not to admit this seems to fly in the face of the 
facts. But to admit it seems paradoxical. 'Determine' 
seems to lose all of its intelligible force, if that 
which is determined conditions the existence of the 
determining elements, and affects the latter's develop-
ment. I think, however, that G. Cohen has made sense 
of such a determinist thesis, which retains a degree of 
explanatory power. All the same, I have reservations 
concerning his reconstruction of historical 
materialism. For it is not clear that the determining 
and determined elements of a society can be sharply 
distinguished. And it is not clear that the degree of 
explanatory power which the determinist thesis retains 
is sufficient to ground historical materialism. 
One of the most distinctive features of Cohen's in-
terpretation of Marx is that he distinguishes three 
main strata in society (i.e. the forces of production, 
the relations of production, and the superstructure), 
rather than the usual two (i.e. the economic base and 
its superstructure). Distinguishing the forces of pro-
duction from relations of production is advantageous 
for the following reason. The notion 'forces of pro-
duction' seems capable of more precision than does talk 
of a society's entire economic structure. And this 
greater precision would lend itself to theorizing about 
societal development. 
In what follows, I will be concerned with the fol-
lowing determinist thesis: The forces of production of 
a society determine the society's relations of produc-
tion. The reasons for this restriction are the 
following. (1) A short paper can only begin to ade-
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quately cover the way that one aspect of society might 
determine another aspect of that society. (2) The pro-
blems that arise respecting the thesis with which I 
will be concerned are of the sort which arise with 
similar Marxian theses; e.g. that the legal, political, 
ideological, etc. structures of a society are deter-
mined by the society's economic base. In particular, 
if sense can be made of the thesis that the relations 
of production are determined by the forces of 
production, even though the former condition and in-
teract with the latter, then it might be plausible to 
think that sense can be made of similar Marxian theses. 
As such, if the problems involved in the thesis with 
which I am concerned can be resolved, then it would be 
at least coherent that problems involved in the general 
theory of historical materialism can be resolved, 
mutatis mutandis. (3) As mentioned already, this the-
sis seems to lend itself to greater precision than the 
other Marxian theses. 
If the thesis that relations of production are 
determined by forces of production is empirically 
testable, then the concepts 'relations of production' 
and 'forces of production' must be legitimized em-
pirical concepts. Let me begin, then, by discussing 
these two concepts. 
If the Marxian analysis of societies and their 
development is a scientific analysis, then a de-
lineation of the structure of societies in general (or 
of a particular sort of society) would be in order. A 
detailed examination as to exactly which institutions 
or features of institutions belong to the relations of 
production and the productive forces would be called 
for. Rather than being concerned with this, however, I 
will follow Cohen's (and W. Shaw's) rather rough 
analysis. Forces of production are sub-divided into 
the two broad categories of means of production and 
labor power. Means of production, in turn, are sub-
divided into the instruments of production and the ob-
ject of production. 'Object of production' is to be 
tinder stood to include both that which is given by 
nature, and that v/hich has been previously worked on by 
man. Relations of production sub-divide into the two 
broad categories of ownership relations and work rela-
tions. 
Instead of delineating a taxonomy of productive 
forces and relations of production, I will try to ex-
plicate the distinction itself. The rough distinction 
seems to be between material and non-material factors 
involved in the production process. But it is not 
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clear how 'material factor' should be understood. The 
emphasis might be on 'material' or on 'non-material.' 
Cohen characterizes 'productive force' as a force 
whose 'facility must be capable of use by a producing 
agent in such a way that production occurs (partly) as 
a result of its use, and it is someone's purpose that 
the facility so contribute to production'.[1] The key 
word is 'use*. Laws, governments, ideologies might 
condition and promote production, but Cohen claims that 
they are not used to promote production. If they are 
used 'to get men to produce, they are means not of 
production but of motivating producers'.(2) 
This is a rather subtle distinction. Further, it 
is not clear that this linguistic criterion will cap-
ture everything and only that v/hich Cohen wants. What 
Cohen wants is something like this. Technological ex-
pertise, skill, experience, etc., must be part of the 
forces of production; for on Cohen's view, this is a 
primary driving force behind historical change. 
Two marks of productive forces are that (1) they 
are material, and (2) they are independent of social 
relations. In producing some 4>-type thing, the produc-
tive forces are those factors which are material, and 
which can be transposed to a different sort of society 
under different sorts of ownership relations and still 
remain the same. But this, of course, raises the 
questions: (a) how 'material' should be construed; and 
(b) how one is to know whether factors in new ownership 
relations are the same factors as they were in the old 
ownership relations. 
Suppose 'material factors' is construed as factors 
v/hich can be understood strictly in terms of physical 
properties, with 'physical properties' understood as 
those properties with v/hich a physicist or chemist is 
concerned. Then the raw materials and tools used would 
presumably fall under 'material factors.' On the other 
hand, assuming a non-materialist theory of the mind, 
technological expertise, skill, experience, etc. are 
not material factors. Further, technological expertise 
seems necessarily social, embedded in a society of 
technicians. 
Suppose, then, that the emphasis in the contrast 
betv/een material/non-material is on non-material. And 
suppose that the contrast is not concerned with social 
factors per se, but rather ownership factors. This 
would seem to capture what Cohen wants. For he seems 
to want to claim: (1) that technological expertise is 
a primary innovative force behind historical change; 
(2) that ownership relations fetter this innovative 
force in such a way that a disruptive change occurs, 
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leading to a newly structured society, with new owner-
ship relations; and (3) that this dynamism between 
technological innovation and ownership relations is re-
sponsible for all (or at least most) of, the more 
dramatic changes in history. 
Now, clearly, this would require a great deal of 
showing. For the moment, however, I am simply concern-
ed with whether the distinction between material and 
non-material factors is viable. If the non-material 
factors are identified with the ownership relations, 
then what about their opposites, the material factors? 
Are they to include everything which is left? Well, 
not everything. For factors in the superstructure pre-
sumably do not belong in the forces of production. 
Suppose, then, that the material factors include every-
thing which is left in the base. But then what exactly 
is the distinction between base and superstructure? 
To cut this short, suppose the relations of produc-
tion are equated with ownership relations, and the 
forces of production are equated with physical factors 
together with technological expertise. Isn't this a 
clear distinction? Not exactly; since it is not clear 
that the technological expertise is entirely indepen-
dent from the ownership realtions of a production 
process. Nor is it clear that when the ownership 
relations are changed that the technological expertise 
itself is not changed. In short, it is not clear that 
these factors in the production process can be neatly 
isolated and construed as independent factors. 
Further, if the relations of production are identified 
with ownership relations, and the forces of production 
identified with physical and technological factors, 
then this seems far afield from Marx himself. For Marx 
entertained a much richer account of historical change 
than that! 
With these reservations concerning the concepts 
'relations of production' and 'forces of production,' 
let me now turn to the determinist thesis. I will (1) 
examine how Marx understood the thesis; (2) examine 
Cohen's interpretation of the thesis; (3) consider 
whether a functional explanation can resolve one of the 
thesis' main difficulties; and (4) consider how ul-
timate the determinist thesis is, if functional expla-
nations are only 'half-way' explanations. 
I will only be concerned with the following of 
Marx's writings: The Preface to A Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy, the Introduction to The 
Grundrisse, and Part I of The German Ideology. Let me 
say, before I begin, that I do not think Marx, Cohen or 
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Shaw want to deny that relations of production can in-
teract with the productive forces. 
Cohen (and Shaw) draws heavily on The Preface to 
support his interpretation of historical materialism. 
As such, his interpretation of Marx is close to this 
text of Marx. A natural question, however, is to what 
extent The Preface reflects Marx's other writings on 
historical materialism. Before doing that, however, 
let me note three points about the Preface. First, as 
Cohen (and Shaw) exphasizes, the general determinist 
thesis that a society's superstructure is determined by 
its economic base is distinguished from the thesis that 
forces of production determine relations of production. 
In fact, Marx says that the material transformations 
'can be determined with the precision of natural 
science,' whereas the other determinist theses are not 
as precise.[3] Second, the forces/relations of produc-
tion contrast seems to be a material/non-material 
contrast. Third, neither of these concepts is ex-
plicated in detail. 
The German Ideology is one of the earliest texts in 
which Marx puts forth the general determinist thesis. 
Let me merely make five points about this text. First, 
as the title suggests, Marx is mainly interested in 
trying to show that history is 'under the sway' of 
material forces, rather than 'under the sway of ideas', 
pace the Hegelians and Utopian Socialists. As such, 
Marx is mainly concerned with the thesis that material 
factors of a society determine the prevailing ideology 
of the society. 
Second, Marx uses the term 'forms of intercourse' 
rather than 'relations of production'; and his use of 
the former is not quite the same as Cohen's use of the 
latter. Marx takes division of labor as a force of 
production.14] But for Cohen (and Shaw) it is a social 
work relation, and as such a relation of production.(5] 
Third, at the end of Part I of the The German 
Ideology, Marx sums up a number of concrete analyses of 
a number of societies with a determinist thesis v/hich 
is quite close to the thesis given in the Preface. He 
writes 
These various conditions (appertaining to forms 
of intercourse] which appear first as conditions 
of self-activity, later as fetters upon it, form 
in the whole evolution of history a coherent 
series of forms of intercourse, the coherence of 
which consists in this: in the place of an ear-
lier force of intercourse, which has become a 
fetter, a new one is put, corresponding to the 
264 
more developed productive forces and, hence, to 
the advanced mode of the self-activity of indi-
viduals—a form which in its turn becomes a fet-
ter and is then replaced by another. Since these 
conditions correspond at every state to the 
simultaneous development of the productive for-
ces, their history is at the same time the 
history of the evolving productive forces taken 
over by each new generation, and is, therefore, 
the history of the development of the forces of 
the individuals themselves.[6) 
And 
Thus all collisions in history have their origin, 
according to our view, in the contradiction be-
tween the productive forces and the forms of in-
tercourse . I 7 J 
Fourth, although Marx intends this to summarize his 
concrete analysis, in fact the analyses are quite rich, 
in that a variety of disparate sorts of things affect 
one another. In particular, the forms of intercourse 
seem to affect the productive forces almost to the ex-
tent that the latter affect the former. 
Fifth, technological development, although a 
factor, is by no means the predominant factor in the 
forces of production. 
In the Introduction to the Grundrisse, Marx again 
gives a number of concrete analyses of societal devel-
opments, and again he sums up these analyses with an 
analogous determinist thesis, that productive forces 
predominate over all other aspects of a society. Here, 
however, the thesis is tempered. For he explicitly 
notes that these other aspects influence the productive 
forces. 
A definite form of production thus determines the 
forms of consumption, distribution, exchange, and 
also the mutual relations between these various 
elements. Of course, production in its one-sided 
form is in its turn influenced by other 
elements.[8] 
As such, instead of there being a 'one-way' causal 
relation, the forces of production and relations of 
production form a dialectic.[9] 
The Introduction to the Grundrisse might best be 
seen as a dialectic between a Hegelian analysis of 
social development and an analysis similar to the clas-
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sical British economists. Marx criticizes Smith, 
Ricardo, et al. for lacking an historical perspective. 
And he criticizes the Hegelians for being unscientific. 
The upshot seems to be that Marx considers his analysis 
to be both historically minded and scientific. 
The success of Marx's historical materialism as a 
legitimate analysis of history might rise or fall on 
whether Marx adequately combines these two concerns; 
or, perhaps, on v/hether these two concerns can be 
combined. If historical materialism is a genuinely 
scientific thesis ('scientific' in the sense that 
causal laws and dispositional properties are analyzed 
roughly along the lines of Hempel), then it is not 
clear why extra historical considerations would be rel-
evant. Suppose the forces of production causally de-
termine relations of production, which in turn causally 
determine the society's superstructure, according to 
empirically determined laws; and that the forces of 
production and relations of production can be clearly 
distinguished. Then it should be merely a matter of 
applying the appropriate laws to determine how the 
relations of production and the superstructure of the 
society will develop. For this reason, I am inclined 
to think that a dialectic betv/een a scientific analysis 
and historical considerations is misplaced. That is, 
if historical materialism really were scientific, then 
Marx's concern with having an adequate historical per-
spective would be misplaced. But I do not want to ar-
gue for this. 
Instead, I want to suggest that there might be a 
legitimate dialectic between historical considerations 
and an analysis which would explain general historical 
tendencies. If such an analysis can produce genuine 
explanations, the determinist thesis concerning forces 
and relations of production might have some teeth in 
it. It might be plausible that the forces determine 
the relations of production, in some fairly strong 
sense of 'determine*. All the same, such an analysis 
could not be mechanically applied. An application of 
the general analysis to a concrete situation would 
require an understanding of that historical situation. 
I would suggest that the determinist thesis con-
cerning the forces and relations of production, under-
stood along these lines, might be a legitimate thesis. 
Let me now partially reconstruct Cohen's argument for 
the thesis. 
Roughly, the argument proceeds in two stages: (1) 
the forces of production of a society tend to develop 
in a certain way; (2), the development of the forces of 
production explain the development of the relations of 
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production. As mentioned earlier, Cohen supports both 
(1) and (2) by appealing to human nature. Man is 
naturally inventive, and he will tend to invent more 
efficient instruments of production. Further, men tend 
to prefer more efficient instruments of production. As 
such, there is a tendency for the forces of production 
to develop and outstrip existing relations of produc-
tion. This sets up a tension in society which is re-
solved by either reverting to earlier forces of produc-
tion or by changing the relations of production. But 
given the human tendency to prefer more efficient in-
struments of production, societies tend to develop in 
such a way that the relations of production follow the 
forces of production.[10| 
As it stands, this argument is much too weak. An 
analogous argument—again based on human nature--might 
be constructed as follows: (1*) societal relations are 
inherently unstable, and therefore they have a tendency 
to change; (2*) being basically conservative, men 
prefer to keep existing institutions rather than change 
them. As such, there is a tendency for societal rela-
tions to break down, putting the society off balance. 
This is set right by the society changing its forces of 
production to correspond with its relations of 
production. But, given human inertia, the forces of 
production lag behind. 
(1') and (2') are nearly contradictory. What keeps 
them from being contradictory is the weakness of 
'tendency' and 'prefer'. For it does not seem con-
tradictory (or at least it is not entirely clear that 
it is contradictory) that a person (or a society) could 
have contradictory tendencies at the same time. But 
this weakness in my rather facetious argument is also a 
weakness in Cohen's argument. And as it stands, mere 
human preferences and tendencies would not seem capable 
of grounding a determinist thesis. 
Cohen tries to strengthen his argument with what he 
considers an historical fact: 'That societies rarely 
replace superior productive forces by inferior 
ones'.[11J As such, the second human tendency is more 
than a tendency. It is a disposition which is rarely 
defeated by other dispositions. 
Even if we grant that Cohen's purported historical 
fact is really a fact, it is not clear how strong the 
argument is. Let me make three points. First, the ar-
gument is to an extent still based on what Cohen takes 
to be human nature. This is somewhat ironical, given a 
traditional Marxian suspicion of a purported human 
nature. Human needs change in different societies. All 
the same, there might be an invariant human nature 
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structuring these changing needs. As Cohen points out, 
Marx at least entertained this possibility.[12] 
Second, man's inventiveness might induce a tendency 
for development in the forces of production. But how 
strong this tendency is depends on how large a role 
technology plays in the forces of production. Prima 
facie, it would seem to be only one of a number of fac-
tors in the development of the productive forces. 
Third, taken as a whole, it is not clear how strong 
the argument is. In particular, it is not clear that 
it can support a determinist thesis. 
If, however, Cohen's argument (or a similar argu-
ment) can support a determinist thesis, the Marxian 
analysis of history becomes coherent and perhaps even 
plausible. For I think Cohen has successfully resolved 
one of its perennial difficulties: that if the forces 
determine the relations of production, how is it possi-
ble that the latter can condition and affect the 
former? 
Briefly, I take Cohen to be arguing that the 
development of forces of production functionally ex-
plains changes in relations of production. And al-
though such functional explanations are not 'rock-
bottom' explanations, they are genuinely explanatory. 
For Cohen, the interaction between relations and 
forces of production is not a problem, but an integral 
part of the explanation why the latter determines the 
former. The relations condition and promote the for-
ces. Certain sorts of productive forces could not ex-
ist in a society without certain kinds of social 
relations. The relations can further the development 
of the forces. They can affect the direction of the 
development. And finally, relations of production 
appropriate to earlier forces of production can fetter 
later developments in the forces of production. For 
example, the centralization of capital might initially 
be necessary for capitalist productive forces to come 
into existence. Further centralization might further 
the development of the productive forces. But even-
tually (supposedly) monopolies become a fetter of the 
productive forces. Despite this interaction, Cohen can 
still say that the productive forces determine the 
relations of production. For instance, he can say that 
the productive relations which tend to exist are those 
v/hich are appropriate to the existing forces of produc-
tion, or to the previously existing forces of produc-
tion. 
Cohen characterizes the functional explanation as 
having the following form: "The productive relations 
are of kind R at time t because relations of kind R are 
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suitable to the use and development of the productive 
forces at t, given the level of development of the lat-
ter at t".(13J This will have to be amended a bit. 
The relations of production may have been appropriate 
for the previous (or fairly recent preceding) forces of 
production. As such, the claim of the predominance of 
the forces of production is coherent. For' even though 
the forces may be conditioned and affected by relations 
of production, these relations exist because they are 
(or were) appropriate to a certain level of develop-
ment. For this reason, Cohen can say "the [productive) 
forces would not develop as they do were the relations 
different, but that is why the relations are not 
different--because relations of the given kind suit the 
development of the forces."[14) 
Now the mere fact that certain relations of produc-
tion were suited to the development of the forces of 
production would not, by itself, seem to explain why 
the former existed. For presumably other relations of 
production, which did not exist, might have been 
equally suitable. Still, the following might suggest 
that the Marxian account of history is genuinely 
explanatory. Suppose that: 
(i) A rich, concrete analysis of history sug-
gested that certain relations of production 
came into existence because they were suited 
to the development of the productive forces. 
(ii) A general principle seemed present in many of 
the more dramatic historical changes; i.e. 
the principle that technological innovations 
being fettered by ownership relations set up 
tensions in societies which are resolved by 
changing the relations of production. 
(iii) This general principle was further supported 
by psychological and sociological facts. 
(iv) A more rigorous explanation of the more dra-
matic historical changes was not available. 
(v) At a later date, the general principle led to 
a deeper, more rigorous explanation. 
If each of these points were the case, then it would be 
plausible that the Marxist account was genuinely 
explanatory. 
An analogous functional account is the Darwinian 
theory of evolution; i.e. that creatures with struc-
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tural features appropriate to a particular competetive 
environment are better able to survive; if the environ-
ment changes, the creatures with the structural fea-
tures appropriate to the changed environment are better 
able to survive. The Darwinian explanation is func-
tional in that it claims that there is a general, long-
term tendency for creatures to adapt to their 
environment. Clearly there is interaction between the 
creatures and their environment; the creatures affect 
their environment. All the same, the Darwinian account 
in which changes in the environment determine changes 
in the anatomy of the creatures is a better account 
than one v/hich v/ould explain changes in the environment 
in terms of changes in the creature's anatomy. But 
this explanation is only a 'half-way' explanation. In 
the 'rock-bottom' explanation, the creature's tissue 
and its environment are both of the same kind, and are 
subject to the same causal laws. The 'rock-bottom' ex-
planation would locate the mechanism (in this case 
genes) which cause the creature's anatomy to adapt. If 
the 'rock-bottom' explanation is available, the func-
tional explanation is more or less useless. But if the 
more adequate explanation is not available, the func-
tional explanation is legitimately explanatory. For in 
part it serves in the discovery of the deeper explana-
tion. 
But suppose that the last point was not fulfilled. 
Suppose in fact that a deeper more rigorous study sug-
gested that the Marxist thesis was illusory. Should we 
say that the previous account had been explanatory, but 
v/as not explanatory now? Or should we say that the 
previous account only seemed explanatory, but in fact 
was not? This is a nice epistemological question. And 
I will leave it as that. For I am not so much in-
terested in defending the Marxist thesis as I am in 
shov/ing that it is at least sensible. 
Suppose then that historical materialism is analo-
gous to a Darwinian theory. If a rock-bottom ex-
planation why relations of production develop is not 
available, then a functional explantion might be legi-
timate. Suppose it is plausible that the relations of 
production develop because they are suited to the 
existing forces of production. Then the latter might 
be said to explain the former; and if the explanation 
is sufficiently strong, the latter might be said to de-
termine the former, even though the one is necessary 
for the other, and vice versa. 
But the following point should be noted. Since the 
explanation is only functional, it is incumbent to look 
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for deeper explantions. And prima facie, the forces of 
production would not show up. in a deeper explanation. 
But a Marxist might be able to live with this. To 
begin with, he is primarily interested in the practical 
value of his theory. Thus, if his theory can make it 
fairly clear that certain relations of a society fetter 
the further development of the forces of production, he 
need not be overly concerned with details. Second, as 
I suggested earlier, historical materialism seems to be 
a legitimate analysis of history only if it is not ter-
ribly scientific. One of its virtues is that it is a 
dialectical analysis, combining a detailed concrete un-
derstanding of the society under investigation with a 
general analysis of historical change. If the analysis 
became genuinely scientific, the dialectic would become 
otiose. As such,, if the Marxist analysis is legiti-
mate, it must remain at a 'half-way1 level. 
The concepts 'forces of production' and 'relations 
of production' are some v/hat suspect. And in that the 
general Marxian analysis seems to be concerned with 
long-term tendencies, it is not clear that the analysis 
is strong enough to be genuinely explanatory. All the 
same, if these difficulties are correctable, there 
would seem to be nothing in principle against histori-
cal materialism. In particular, the interaction be-
tween two sorts of things does not seem to imply that 
the one sort of thing can not be said to determine the 
other. 
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